Reference
Security Model
Secure Exec runs guest code inside a fully virtualized VM so untrusted code stays contained. At a glance:
- V8 isolate boundary: Guest JavaScript runs in a V8 isolate inside the kernel. It never spawns a real host process, touches the real host filesystem, or opens a real host socket.
- Sidecar enforces: A trusted sidecar owns the kernel, VFS, socket table, and permission policy. Every guest syscall is mediated and checked there, not on the host.
- Executor is untrusted: The code you submit for execution is treated as actively hostile. How it reached the executor never makes it trusted.
- Secure defaults: The network is deny-by-default; filesystem, child processes, process info, and env are enabled so normal programs run. Resource and timing limits bound runaway or hostile code.
Full reference
Section titled “Full reference”The canonical threat model, trust boundaries, and detailed enforcement guarantees are owned by agentOS.
agentOS: Security Model The complete trust model, threat model, and enforcement details.